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RECENT BOOKS
BOOK REVIEWS
COMPARATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN TAXATION.

Edited by L. Hart Wright. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Law School. 1968. Pp. xx.v, 468. $10.

Review I
Any workable tax system must include mechanisms for resolving
the uncertainties and disputes which inevitably arise in the operation of the system. In the nature of things, those who establish the
governing statutory structure can foresee only a small part of the
total universe of transactions, plans, and events to which the law
will ultimately apply; and even if they could anticipate all of the
questions, the statute would hardly afford them an appropriate vehicle for all of the answers. Necessarily, then, interpretative problems will occur. How does the law apply to classes of activities for
which it makes no explicit provision? What are the tax consequences
of transactions which are subject to inconsistent or ambiguous statutory mandates?
The officials charged with the administration of the system need
answers to these questions. So do the taxpayers affected by the system.
When a tax.payer contemplates a transaction the desirability of which
is heavily influenced by tax considerations, he may well want to know
the position of the system's administrators before he proceeds. When
the administrators seek to collect a tax from a person who believes
that he does not owe it, the resultant controversy must be resolved,
either within the administrative framework, or by an independent
adjudicative body.
The methods which the United States, Belgium, France, West
Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands have developed to cope
with problems like these are the subject of the recent Comparative Gon-fiict Resolution Procedures in Taxation, by Professor L.
Hart Wright in collaboration with a research associate and tax experts
from each of the European nations included in the study. Written
with care and sophistication, the work should be of use to a variety
of persons concerned with tax.es: tax practitioners and business advisors whose work brings them into contact with the European administrative systems described, parties in and out of the Government
who wish to refer to the experience of other countries to improve
their own tax procedures, and participants in the establishment of
new tax structures in emerging nations or elsewhere.
Professor Wright has himself had a good deal to do with the practical operation of the machinery by which the United States tax system resolves uncertainties and settles disputes. One· of the most ac-
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complished and best known of our tax educators, he has taught at the
University of Michigan Law School for almost twenty-five years; and
the alumni of his classes now form considerable parts of both the
private tax bar and the legal staffs which represent the Government in tax matters. If their analysis is not always clear and precise
or their methodology not always ordered, the defect does not lie with
their education in tax law. Professor Wright's books and articles have
contributed to our understanding of such substantive subjects as the
law of tax liens1 and the participation of domestic enterprises in Common Market dealings.2 Of greater importance for present purposes,
Professor Wright has repeatedly advised the Internal Revenue Service on matters of organization, training, and procedure; he prepared the materials which the Service presently uses to train both
its audit and its rulings personnel; and his work with the Service
has left him intimat~ly familiar with its operations and its problems.
When he discusses tax administration, then, one does well to listen.
Characteristically, Professor Wright's direction of the preparation
of Comparative Conflict Resolution Procedures has brought meticulous organization to the work. Separate sections of the book describe
the procedures by which tax disputes are resolved in each of the six
nations covered by the study. Each section explains (I) the administrative rule-making system of the country under consideration, (2) the
country's procedures for assessment, refund, and administrative appeal, and (3) the function of the country's independent tribunals in
the decision of contested issues. Professor Wright draws the material
together in an extended initial section which provides an exposition
of the United States' procedures, compares them with those of the
other nations, and outlines his own views on the ideal approach to
each problem.
The fundamental tripartite division of the subject matter of the
book lends itself naturally to separate review of each of the work's
three major areas of coverage. This Review limits itself to the treatment of administrative rule-making.
The over-all theme of Professor Wright's discussion of this subject
is the necessity, in any relatively complex tax system, of a centrally
administered interpretative program. In the United States, the Treasury Department and the National Office of the Internal Revenue
Service perform this function through the promulgation of regulations, the publication of generally applicable rulings, the issuance of
private rulings, and the provision of technical advice to the Service's
field offices. With the proposition that these programs have been of
1. See, e.g., T. PLUMB & L. HART WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENS (2d ed. 1967); Wright,
Michigan Title Examinations and the 1954 Revenue Code's New General Lien Provisions, 53 MICH. L. REY. 393 (1955).
2. See TAXATION, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN nm EUROPEAN COMMON MArucET: A
LEGAL PROFILE ch. 11 (E. Stein &: T. Nicholson ed. 1960).
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major advantage to the operation of the American system, few
would be inclined to disagree. However, the use of these programs
in this country has exposed some important problems, which Professor Wright examines with insight and realism.
A critical set of problems can, for example, arise from the relationship between the program of private rulings and that of published rulings. The goals of the two programs are quite different. The
essential aim of private rulings is to permit commercial dealings to
go £award unimpeded by the absence, in the tax statute and other
authorities, of clear and definite guides to the tax results of such
dealings. Hence, willingness to come to grips with reasonably
difficult issues is at least a desirable feature of a private-rulings program, and promptness in responding to taxpayer inquiries is an essential attribute of a successful one. If the administrative agency
answers only the easy questions, its rulings will be of limited assistance
to the business planner; and if it answers slowly, the rulings will
frequently be of no assistance to a business world in which action
often must be taken quickly or not at all.
Published rulings, on the other hand, are designed to provide information to all taxpayers and to the field personnel of the agency
charged with the administration of the nation's tax system. Such
rulings explain the application of the statute and the regulations to
situations which neither statute nor regulations treat specifically,
but which have been demonstrated by experience to have importance for a significant number of taxpayers. Because published
rulings state positions which the agency intends to apply to all similarly situated taxpayers, and because in practice it is often difficult for
the agency to reverse a position adopted in a published ruling, it is
crucial that these rulings be correct. Today's erroneous publication
can too easily become tomorrow's major tax reform issue, capable of
resolution, as a practical matter, only by legislative action. The
long history of the United States' tax rulings reveals surprisingly
few instances of such errors, particularly in light of the volume of
rulings published each year; but the effects of the mistakes which have
occurred have been exceedingly difficult to root out. An illustration
of the difficulty is the 1920 ruling which held that premiums paid by
an employer on group-term life insurance do not constitute income
to the insured employees3-a holding which, despite partial correction by the Revenue Act of 1964,4 even now produces a revenue loss
of 400 million dollars each year. 5 Another example is the 1954 ruling
3. O. 104, 2 CuM. BuLL. 88 (1920).
4. !NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 79,
5. Statement of Joseph W. Barr, Secretary of the Treasury, in Hearings on the
1969 Economic Report of the President before the Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 8-44 (1969).
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which passed favorably on industrial-development bonds 6 and was
not finally corrected by Congress until 1964 (again with exceptions).7
Therefore, while it is useful to have rulings published as soon as possible after problem areas surface at the administrative level, the
promptness so necessary to the success of the private-rulings program
must, in the public-ruling program, take second place to soundness
of result; and it must do so particularly when the issues are difficult.
These differences in priority of aims between the private-rulings
program and the published-rulings program can lead to serious distortions if the two programs are closely interrelated in operation. If
private rulings are limited by the standards which govern public rulings, delay in the issuance of at least some rulings necessarily results
-and produces a slowing or a rechanneling of the very commercial
processes which the private-rulings program is undertaken to free
from ta.x impediment. Reluctance to resolve difficult issues may also
ensue. Conversely, if rulings are published as quickly as they are issued privately, without undergoing a thorough review beyond that
required for private rulings and, in some instances, without awaiting
the development of greater experience with the problem area, incorrect rulings will be published and may become irretrievably incorporated in the interpretative system.
Professor Wright's solution is strict separation of the objectives
of the two programs, with the personnel responsible for each
program instructed to adhere to the standards appropriate to their
own program. It is a good solution, and perhaps the best that can be
given in the abstract. Still, strong pressures to conjoin the two programs will persist, and strict separation will be a good deal more
difficult to maintain in practice than it is to justify in theory. In the
United States, members and committees of Congress have repeatedly
taken the position that the published-rulings program should be
used to police the private-rulings system by making public all significant private rulings soon after they are issued to the particular
taxpayers who have requested them. 8 Again, those responsible for
the published-rulings program may become subject to institutional
pressures to increase their output. Because the major source of grist
for publication will be the products of the private-rulings program,
any such influence will inevitably tend to draw the publication program closer to the private program-and make it increasingly subject
6. Rev. Rule. 54-106, 1954-1 CUM, BULL. 28.
7. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 103(c).
8. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Investigation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, 68th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 30-31, 56-57, 3630-61 (19241925); S. REP. No. 27, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 229-34 (1926); Hearings on Administration
of the Internal Revenue Laws Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1340 (1953).
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to the standards of the private program. Finally, even in the absence
of these forces, persuasive argument can be made that what the administrative agency does for the taxpayer who requests a private
ruling, it should also do for all other taxpayers. Indeed, how else can
one achieve the national uniformity upon which a sound tax system
must be based? Yet if the agency accedes entirely to this argument,
all private rulings will forthwith be published, and the objectives of
one or the other program will have to be sacrificed.9
In the last analysis, it is probably impossible to preserve perfect
independence for the two programs. At least, such separation has not
been achieved in the United States. As elsewhere in governmentand life-the final result will most likely be a compromise; and the
agency responsible for the administration of the tax system will be
doing well if it can establish the proper standards for each program
and adhere to them with reasonable success in most cases.
The ideal administrative rule-making system which Professor
Wright suggests departs from present American practice in another
respect. Professor Wright recommends that published rulings be
adopted as the official interpretative position of the administrative
agency only after they have been issued in proposed form and the
public has been given an opportunity to comment on them. Presumably, this recommendation would make published rulings subject
to much the same procedures as are now applied to regulationswith a proposed draft published, the public allowed to submit ·written comments within a specified period of time, a public hearing
held if sufficient interest appears, and a final form adopted only after
consideration of the public comments.
The judgment of the Internal Revenue Service has so far been
that the large volume of rulings processed for publication makes it
unfeasible to solicit public comments before adoption. Nevertheless, Professor Wright can make a good case for his view. Particularly
with issues which have not previously aroused wide-spread concern
among taxpayers, a private ruling adverse to the taxpayer's interest
may finally be published-and thereby made applicable to all taxpayers-even though the Service has had the benefit of only a single
party's presentation of the contrary view. The ruling will, of course,
have been subjected to the Service's own analysis and review at
several levels. Nonetheless, if those who represented the taxpayer in
the original ruling application presented their case badly-or posed
9. Perhaps the fact that one taxpayer applies for a ruling and the others do not
is sufficient ground to justify at least a delay in the accomplishment of uniformity. The
taxpayer who applies, after all, thereby provides evidence of the reality and immediacy
of his need. Hence, it can be argued that the administrative agency is justified in post•
poning publication-making the answer available to all those who did not ask for ituntil it has subjected the private ruling to rigorous review and, when necessary, developed a more thorough knowledge of the problem and its implications.
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the issue in such a way that the Service's subsequent independent
research does not reveal the true strength of the taxpayer's casethe Service may reach the wrong result. Thereafter, with the result
hardened into official Service policy by publication, other taxpayers,
seeking to reverse the ruling, will be confronted with an uphill
battle, no matter how well they present their case. They may finally
prevail-through litigation if they are unable to convince the Service itself of the error-but the going will have been difficult, timeconsuming, and expensive. If such trouble can be avoided by permitting public comments on the issue before the Service has taken any
official position, why not provide a mechanism for such comments?
The argument in favor of the existing practice is that the
publication program is helpful to a broad range of taxpayers
in a number of ways. Since any general solicitation of public views
on proposed rulings would divert a substantial share of the manpower resources presently devoted to the program, the number of
rulings which could be published in any given time would be diminished, and to that extent the public benefit from the program would
be curtailed. It is also worth noting that, although the mechanism
which Professor Wright suggests would establish a safeguard against
anti-taxpayer errors by the Service, it would do nothing to reduce
the number of pro-taxpayer errors. Presumably, advance notice of
the rulings on group-term life insurance and industrial-development
bonds would have evoked nothing but praise (or a studied silence)
from the interested members of the public. If the Service must maintain an internal review machinery satisfactory to guard against
mistakes in favor of taxpayers, why is not the same machinery adequate protection against mistakes of the contrary variety?
Plainly, proper resolution of the issue requires more precise data
than the public, at least, now has about the impact which advance
publication would have upon the two competing interests involved.
By how much would the step diminish the flow of published rulings?
Would that reduction be likely to apply to important rulings, or to
those of marginal utility? How worthwhile would the protection
provided by notice in fact be? Are there really a significant number
of erroneous anti-taxpayer rulings which it could reasonably be expected to prevent?
It would require no great ingenuity to develop some useful
responses to these questions. The Service might even test the procedure on a limited basis with a sample group of its pending
rulings. Perhaps a middle ground would afford the optimum solution. The Service might, for example, provide notice only for
selected rulings involving issues which are unusually difficult or of
widespread interest. Such an approach might minimize the drain on
the resources of the publication program and at the same time con-
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centrate the use of the advance-publication safeguard upon those
areas most likely to profit from it. In any event, the idea of advance
publication of at least certain types of rulings seems worth further
exploration; and while the suggestion did not originate with Professor Wright, his renewal of it and his persuasive argument in its
behalf are to be commended.
One aspect of Professor Wright's discussion of the American
regulations program deserves comment. In his exposition of the
treatment accorded regulations in our courts, Professor Wright
outlines three rationales which have been employed to justify the
grant of special weight to them: the contemporaneous-construction
analysis, the re-enactment doctrine, and the argument that disinclination to overturn a regulation ought to increase with its duration. The implication is that, unless one of these theories applies
to a regulation, it will not be given special consideration by the
courts.
Such an approach would preclude a small, but important
and highly useful group of regulations from receiving appropriate weight. Occasionally serious problems develop long after the
enactment of a relevant statutory provision. They may result from
the advent of new commercial practices; from efforts by taxpayers
to plan around the statutory provision or to use it for purposes not
originally intended; or from activities which existed when the statute
was enacted, but which gained public prominence-and the attention
of taxing authorities-only much later. For a variety of reasons, the
rulings process may not be suitable for a comprehensive, principled
resolution of these problems. When the policy underlying the original
legislative action extends also to the new problems, and when the
statutory implementation of that policy can be reasonably construed
to deal with them, it would seem entirely proper for the Treasury
Department and the Internal Revenue Service to exercise their administrative authority to issue regulations on the matter. Recent
examples of such situations include the revised and much expanded
regulations adopted under section 482; 10 the regulations proposed
in 1968 on industrial-development bonds; 11 and the comprehensive
1967 revision of the regulations under the unrelated business income tax12-which provided a systematic elaboration of the principles
of that tax and explained their application to such activities of
exempt organizations as publication advertising and trade shows. 18
In each of these cases, the regulations were based upon a thor10. T .D. 6952, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 218.
11. 33 Fed. Reg. 4950 (1968). As has been stated, these regulations were quickly
superseded by new congressional action proceeding in the same direction.
12. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 511-13.
13. T.D. 6939, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 274.
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ough review of the policy considerations which led Congress to adopt
the statutory provisions in question; in each, painstaking investigation of the factual nature and background of the new problems
preceded the drafting of the regulations; and in each case, the work
was performed by a joint task force of specialists from the Internal
Revenue Service and the Treasury Department, consulting with
experts outside the Government. The two regulations which were
ultimately promulgated were finalized only after extensive public
commentary and hearings on proposed drafts; and in all three instances the regulations had been reviewed and approved at a•number of levels in the Service and the Treasury Department which
would not have been required to pass upon published rulings. Since
these regulations succeeded by many years the legislative acts upon
which they were grounded, they cannot claim the benefit of the
contemporaneous-construction argument; and if they were to be
challenged in the courts within a few years of adoption, neither the
extended-duration nor re-enactment rationales would apply. Yet it
would require no more than a realistic recognition of the procedures by which they were developed and adopted-because of their
formal status as regulations, rather than ad hoc rulings-to hold
that these regulations are entitled to substantially more weight than
rulings. And in fact the approach of the Supreme Court would seem
to confirm that judgment.14
Those familiar with the rule-making system of the Internal
Revenue Service and the Treasury Department will find themselves
quite at home with the ideal system which Professor Wright recommends. The two systems are very much alike. As has been shmvn
with respect to the proposal for advance publication of rulings of
general application, there are some differences; but they are not
major. The fundamental structure of the ideal system-and a good
many of its details--come from American experience. Presumably
all of this is as it should be. The configuration of the ideal undoubtedly stems from Professor Wright's independent evaluation of
the problems, his general rejection of the approaches which have
evolved in the European nations included in the study, and his
conclusion that the United States' mechanisms are essentially the
best. Still, one would like to know a bit more about the results
which have followed from some of the approaches of other nations.
If a centralized interpretative program is necessary to the operation
of a complex tax system, how has Britain, with a tax statute almost
as complex as our own, managed to avoid such a program altogether?
What problems have resulted? How have they been met? Information of this sort would surely be helpful to one who is attempting
14. Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1941); Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co.,
808 U.S. 901 (1989); Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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to determine which is the best procedure, and it might also suggest
possibilities for improving the United States' procedures. Gulliver,
after all, finally understood the English only after a rather impressive
series of foreign travels; and perhaps we could learn important lessons about our own system from the experiments of others with entirely different systems.
If one feels mild disappointment with Comparative Conflict
Resolution Procedures on this score, however, it detracts very little
from the over-all judgment of strong approval. The book represents
an impressive undertaking, impressively carried out. Professor Wright
and his co-authors deserve compliments on a careful, incisive, and
thoroughly useful job.

Thomas A. Troyer,
Member of the District of Columbia Bar
and
Arthur B. White,
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel,
United States Internal Revenue Seroice1rs

Review II
Professor Wright and five European colleagues have addressed
themselves to a central question facing all governments founded on
law and public opinion: how to provide their citizens with uniform, fair, inexpensive, readily available, and timely resolution of
their disagreements on tax matters. As Professor Wright emphasizes,
the structures and procedures of all organizations represent a tradeoff among these multiple criteria.
The prevention and resolution of conflict is a salient problem of
this country's Internal Revenue Service. Each year more than a
million taxpayers are informed, after examination, that there have
been deficiencies in their self-report of taxes. Only a small percentage of them take their cases to the appeals process, whether it be
through administrative or judicial channels. Professor Wright has
admirably analyzed the interplay, in the six counties studied, of the
administrative and judicial methods for resolving such conflicts,
and has described methods for preventing conflicts. He comprehensively discusses the major aspects relevant to preventing conflict
15. Mr. White's views stated here are his own, and are not necessarily those of the
Internal Revenue Service.
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-the clarity of the law, a centralized interpretative unit, comprehensive regulations, publicly available rulings, and technical assistance. But even these steps, he says, are not sufficient in a complex
society to prevent conflict.
In the United States we take many steps at the original examining level to "avoid" conflict: a thorough training program for
examiners, to which Professor Wright has contributed more than
any other single person; technical guidance provided to examiners
on specific issues; a general directive that the examiner fully explain
to the taxpayer both the reasons for the deficiency and the fact that
he will be satisfied with substantial, not perfect, compliance; and
the review process. But these steps will not prevent the appeal of all
disputes, because the initial examining officer is not permitted to
take litigation hazards into account in resolving disputes,1 and hence
some questions cannot be settled at the examining level. However,
the taxpayer is granted a right of appeal to the Appellate Division
at which litigation hazards may be considered.2 Since there are
thousands of examining officers, and since it is not possible to review the large number of discretionary judgments made by those
officers with the same time and care that is given to matters handled
in the Appellate Division, it would be impractical to vest the examining officers with the discretionary authority to consider litigation hazards.
The only common component in the six countries studied is the
availability of an independent tribunal-a necessary institution,
but, as Professor Wright ex.plains, one which can be costly and inefficient if the tribunal is forced to handle too many disputes. The
authors state that Belgium, France, and Great Britain use independent lay tribunals, but that in the first two countries these bodies
are only advisory and can be bypassed. They state further that in
Belgium and France, as in the United States, the regional office provides the highest level of administrative appeal. In Germany, however, according to the authors, the taxpayer has no administrative
appeal and instead goes from the local examiner directly to a
specialized, decentralized court; while the Netherlands provides
specialized chambers within its regular court system. In the United
States the taxpayer may choose to resolve his conflict through administrative or judicial channels, or through a combination of both;
and within each of these channels the taxpayer has a choice of
avenues. In each country the design of the administrative and judicial appeals systems has been influenced by tradition, geographical
dispersion, and the calibre and integrity of officials; and in our own
nation, the sheer number of taxpayers has had a significant influence
as well.
1. 26 C.F.R. 601.105(c)(5) (1970).
2. 26 C.F.R. 601.106(£)(2) (1970).
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There can be no single solution among all countries to the
problem of achieving a proper balance between administrative and
judicial methods of "conflict" resolution. Generally, the administrative route is cheaper, quicker, and better able to handle a large
volume of cases. In addition, since the administrator, as Professor
Wright emphasizes, is bound by his own regulations and rulings,
and since the judges in most countries are not specialized, the administrative route is also generally more consistent. On the other
hand, the judicial route is generally seen as more independent.
Nevertheless, in the United States, policy guidance, organizational
separation of appeals from examining officers, the right of the Appellate Division's conferees to take into account the hazards of litigation, supervision, review, and easy access to the judicial process help
to ensure both an independent review by existing appeals officials
and the responsiveness of such officials to judicial interpretations.
Professor Wright feels that an appeals official would be even more
responsive to judicial interpretation if he were required to try his
own cases before the judiciary. But there is another side to this
argument. An official who must try the case might be tempted to
yield in order to avoid a potential "loss" in court, whereas a purely
administrative official might in some cases be less willing to compromise and more willing to go to court to clarify the issue. In
addition, a purely administrative official knows that in many cases
there will be no appeal to the judiciary. In any event, the American experience suggests that the separate administrative process has
proved responsive, as is evidenced by the relatively few cases that
go through any channel of appeal, and the far fewer cases that
are tried in court. Indeed, the size and rate of agreement of the
nondocketed cases in the Appellate Division has increased over the
past years, while the Division has continued to increase its accessibility to the small taxpayer, who is less likely to carry his appeal
to the judicial system.
In summary, considering the complexity of tax law, the multitude of factual situations, the thousands of examining officers, the
amounts of money involved, and the relatively simple system for
appeals, there will always be tax disputes moving "up the line."
Professor Wright has charted a course for organizing a system to
prevent and resolve those disputes. All tax administrators are in
his debt.
Donald W. Bacon,
Assistant Commissioner (Compliance),
United States Internal Revenue Service3
3. The Michigan Law Review may be unique in asking an administrator to
review a book analyzing his function. I assume that neither conflict of interest nor
entrapment is involved.

